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COMMENTARY
THE NEXT STEP FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL TOBIAS*

Professor Arthur Hellman recently published a trenchant critique1 of the
report compiled by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals.2 In The Unldndest Cut: The White Commission
Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, he emphasizes that the report
adduced little empirical data which demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit
operates inefficaciously.3 Indeed, the commissioners candidly declared:
"There is no persuasive evidence that the Ninth Circuit ... is not working
effectively ... .''4 Despite this admission, the Commission prescribed
drastic change with a divisional concept,5 which Professor Hellman finds
flawed. 6 He thus urges that Congress "reject the proposal and allow" the

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish
to thank Michael Higdon, Peggy Sanner and Jeff Stempel for valuable suggestions, Angela Dufva for
processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure
the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL L. REv. 377 (2000).
2.

COMMISSION ON SIRUCI1JRAL ALTERNATIVE.S FOR TIIE RIDERAL COURTS OF APPEALs, FINAL

REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
3. Hellman, supra note l, at 378.
4. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (affording the identical admission for all of the
regional circuits).
5. See id. at 40-50. See also id. at 60-62 (proposing that Congress authorize divisions for the
other circuits as their numbers of appeals grow).
6. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 402. See also Recent Cases, Final Report of the Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals; and S. 253, the Ninth Circuit
Reorganization Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 822, 824-27 (2000) [hereinafter Commission Critique].
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circuit to continue the successful experimentation which it has pursued for
twenty years.7
The next step is crucial. Congress is now seriously considering three
major bills. One would implement the Commission plan. 8 Another would
split the court.9 A third would treat Commission concerns by regionally
assigning judges and modifying the limited en bane process. 10 The Ninth
Circuit itself endorses the last option as a "reasoned, responsible alternative
to [Senate Bill 253's] radical restructuring." 11 These proposals are among
two dozen recommendations of an Evaluation Committee which is
assessing the administrative structure and the operations of the circuit. I2
This essay undertakes an analysis of the Commission's work, The
Unkindest Cut, the Senate Bills, and the Ninth Circuit's own efforts. I
initially evaluate the article and then compare the measures being explored.
My essay concludes with an examination of the best approach.

I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNKINDEST CUT
Professor Hellman carefully assesses the Commission. He first
discusses its origins, statutory charge, and the introduction of a bill that
embodies the Commission plan. I3 The writer then scrutinizes the divisional
suggestion for reorganizing the Ninth Circuit into three regionally based
divisions. These divisions would function as semiautonomous decisional
unitsI 4 and have their own three-judge panels and en bane courts, whose
opinions would only bind specific divisions. Is A Circuit Division would
resolve square interdivisional conflicts. I6 The author finds "abandonment of

7. Hellman, supra note I, at 402. For support of this view, see infra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text.
8. See Federal Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act of I999, S. 253, l06th Cong.
9. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of2000, S. 2I 84, 106th Cong.
IO. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals En Banc Procedures Act of I999, S. I403, 106th Cong.
I I. Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The Innovative Work of
the Evaluation Committee 4 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
I2. NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMMITJ'EE, INTERIM REPORT (Mar. 22, 2000) [hereinafter
COMMITJ'EE INTERIM REPORT].
I3. Hellman, supra note I, at 378-81. For a similar account, see Commission Critique, s11pra
note 6.
I4. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-45; Hellman, supra note I, at 38I-82.
IS. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 4I-45; Hellman, supra note I, at 382-83.
I6. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. The circuit chief judge and twelve active
judges-four from each regional division-would serve staggered three-year temJS. See id. See also
Hellman, supra note I, at 383.
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circuit-wide stare decisis" the plan's "most radical aspect." 17 It would
authorize intracircuit inconsistency by permitting judges to reject another
division's precedent. 18 The Circuit Division is the chief response to this
concern; absent the entity "there could be no pretense that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals remained intact in anything but name." 19 Professor
Hellman ascertains that the Circuit Division's limited authority is a central
problem.2 For example, the body would resolve only clear conflicts
between the divisions and could hear no appeals on its own motion.21 In
addition to eliminating the circuit-wide en bane court, the concept would
jettison informal processes whereby all judges can alert panel members to
apparent deviations from circuit precedent and preserve uniformity without
en bane hearings.22 The writer claims that divisions would discharge lawdeclaration duties almost as separate courts and develop their own
precedent,23 which Circuit Division decisions would affect so minimally
that the "law of the circuit would shrink to near-insignificance."24 The plan
would essentially divide the Court of Appeals and, thus, is not the
ostensible compromise proffered.25

°

Professor Hellman next says the approach, despite its deficiencies,
"might be worth pursuing'' had the Commission delineated any
complications which smaller decisional units could remedy.26 However, no
evidence suggests such a problem.27 The author finds the rationale for the
Commission plan-that appeals courts' law-declaring function demands
fewer judges than the present Ninth Circuit28-is premised on two related
ideas: a big court's members cannot monitor all of its opinions and large
17. Hellman, supra note I, at 382-83. See also Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Court of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the
Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887, 909 (1999).
18. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 384. See also Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 825
(voicing concern about intercircuit inconsistency).
19. Hellman, supra note l, at 384. He describes the entity as the "keystone of the Commission
plan." Id.
20. See id. at 384-88.
21. See id. It will foster "time-consuming and uncollegial disput[es] over whether [a] new case
creates a 'square' conflict'' or will be unable "to eliminate less blatant inconsistencies of the kind" that
now create concern. Id. at 388.
22. See id. at 390. See also Hug, supra note 17, at 907.
23. See Hellman, supra note 1, at391-92.
24. Id. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hellman finds that the Circuit Division would
issue relatively few decisions. Id.
25. See id. at 392-93. See also Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 825-26 (affording
additional criticisms).
26. Hellman, supra note 1, at 393.
27. See id. See also Hug, supra note 17, at 899-906.
28. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; Hellman, supra note 1, at 393.
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circuits "have difficulty developing and maintaining consistent and coherent
law."29 Neither concept withstands close analysis. The writer criticizes as "a
relic of the pre-computer era" the theory that judges must read each case to
track precedent.30 The Commission also conflates "very different
activities: keeping up with circuit law and monitoring panel opinions."31
The commissioners mistakenly speak of decisions' "volume,"32 which does
not correlate with circuit size,33 while the judges clearly conduct much
monitoring.34
The author believes equally deficient the claim that big units cannot
preserve uniform and coherent law,35 denominating the Commission's
allusion to "'perceptions' of inconsistency" and to its own "'judgment,
based on experience"' as a remarkably weak foundation for so substantial a
structure.36 The entity does mention, but in essence ignores, empirical
research on Ninth Circuit uniformity .37 He finds the absence of examples
and few specifics "emblematic of ... flimsy evidentiary support."38
Professor Hellman concludes by describing the Commission plan as a
"conscientious attempt to respond to criticisms" of the court39 and preserve
an "'administrative structure that no one has seriously challenged."'40
However, the writer characterizes the idea as flawed "in conception and in
execution" and suggests that Congress eschew the notion and that the Ninth
Circuit continue the profitable testing that it has performed for two
decades.41

29. Hellman, supra note 1, at393. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, nt 47.
30. Hellman, supra note 1, at 394 (citing Letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. to Justice
Byron White (Aug. 29, 1998) (visited Jnn. 1, 2000) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/henrings/submitted/
hug.htrn>.
31. Hellman, supra note l, nt 394.
32 Id. at 395. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, nt 47.
33. See Hellman, supra note l, nt 395. Three circuits issued more opinions thnn the Ninth
Circuit in 1998. See id.
34. See id. at 395-96 (arguing that there is much evidence of monitoring).
35. See id. nt 397-401. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, nt 47. For similar views,
see J. Clifford Wallaee, The Case for Large Federal Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE 288 (1994).
36. Hellman, supra note l, nt 397 (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, nt 47). The
"perceptions" apparently derive from surveys that "raise some doubt about the conclusions drawn." Id. at
398. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
37. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 397. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, nt 39; infra
notes 75-76 nnd nccompnnying text
38. Hellman, supra note l, nt 401. The Commission identified no problems thnt the divisionnl
iden would cure. See id.
39. Id. nt 401.
40. Id. nt 402 (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 57).
41. Id. at 402. See also infra notes 69-70 nnd accompanying text
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II. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE MEASURES
There are now three principal attempts to address the Ninth Circuit
situation. They are (1) the Commission prescriptions incorporated in
Senate Bill 253; (2) the circuit-splitting concept included in Senate Bill
2184; and (3) the court's ongoing application of, and experimentation with,
effective mechanisms, some of which are in Senate Bill 1403 and which the
Evaluation Committee is presently considering. Certain facets of these
approaches might also apply in various combinations.
A. THE DMSIONAL APPROACH: SENATE BILL 253
Because many ideas, most cogently espoused by Professor Hellman,
require rejection of the Commission plan embodied in Senate Bill 253, I
analyze them mainly for emphasis here.42 Divisions are deficient primarily
because they abandon circuit-wide stare decisis.43 The measure's use in
one circuit would require another level of appeals.44 The Supreme Court
may also be unwilling to review cases from one division which conflict
with opinions of a circuit. Even were the Justices less reluctant, pressure to
harmonize federal law would increase.45 Despite those flaws, the plan might
deserve application if there were problems that it would rectify. However, no
empirical data clearly show severe difficulty, which is a prerequisite for
radical change in a century-old institution. The divisional concept's
rationale-that law-declaration demands rather few judges-is based on
the inability of a large circuit's judges to track its cases and of big courts to
develop and preserve uniform and coherent law.46 However, Professor
Hellman persuasively criticizes both notions.47

42. The remarlcs upon S. 253's introduction add little to the Commission's reasons for its plan
and, thus, receive less analysis than the remarks upon introduction of S. 2184 and S. 1403. See infra
notes 47-55, 88-93 and accompanying text See also 145 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)
(affording remarlcs).
43. See Hellman, supra note l, at 382-90; Hug, supra note 17, at 909.
44. See Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of

Appeals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 169 (1999) [hereinafter Final Report Hearing] (statement of Ronald L.
Olson, Esq., Munger, Tolles & Olson); Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 825.
45. See Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 825.
46. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. For more discussion of these, and additional,
criticisms, see Hug, supra note 17, at 909-15 and Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 824-27.
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B. CIRCUIT-SPLITTING: SENATEBILL2184
In March, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) introduced Senate Bill 2184,48 which would leave Arizona,
California and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit and create a new Twelfth
Circuit.49 Because some lawmakers were "not too happy with" divisions,
Murkowski offered the bill as a "more direct and simplified solution"
which would foster a "more cohesive, efficient and predictable judiciary :•50
He claimed that judges "cannot follow the number of cases pending" and
that "[i]nconsistent decisions and improper constitutional interpretations are
not unusual."51 He further explained that the court has a high reversal rate, 52
which Senator Hatch ascribed to the "lack of internal decisional
consistency."53 Hatch also found judges unable to monitor, and correct,
opinions that "stray from the law of the circuit," which undermines
coherence.54 The senator elaborated: unless the active judges read all
decisions, insuring en bane calls for review of appropriate cases is difficult,
while the limited en bane court convenes too infrequently and its opinions may
not reflect a majority's view.55 He concluded that two courts, whose judges
must read half as many of "their colleagues' opinions," would better foster
error-correction and coherence.56

Congress must not pass Senate Bill 2184 for numerous reasons, most of
which the commissioners enunciated.57 They clearly rejected bifurcation,
seeing "no good reason to split the circuit solely out of concern for its size
or administration [or] the consistency, predictability and coherence of circuit
law."58 The Commission eschewed bifurcation as a permanent remedy for

48. See 146 CONG. REC. Sl233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch, chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee).
49. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Oregon and Washington would comprise the new Twelfth Circuit. See id.
50. 146 CONG. REC. Sl233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
51. Id. at Sl233-34. He ascribed these undesirable outcomes to size, which includes geography,
population and cases. See id.
52. In the 1996-1997 tenn, the Supreme Court reversed an "astounding 96 percent of the cases
reviewed," and, in the last three years, a third of the reversals were Ninth Circuit opinions. See id. at
Sl234.
53. Id. at Sl235 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
54. Id. at Sl234. Senator Hatch, like Senator Mutkowski, ascribed these ideas to size, which
includes geography, population and judges. See id.
55. See id. at Sl235. See also Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 825-26.
56. See 146 CONG. REC. Sl235 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
57. Many arguments for rejecting the divisional plan similarly apply to circuit-splitting.
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix.
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docket growth experienced by many courts,59 which would reduce federal
law's unifonnity and increase pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve
intercircuit inconsistency.60 It admonished that a split would forfeit administrative benefits,61 such as flexible case assignments and certain economies
of scale,62 and declared that having one court in the West interpret federal
law, especially "commercial and maritime laws that govern relations with
other nations on the Pacific Rim, is a strength ... that should be
maintained." 63 The commissioners reiterated the practical administrative
gains and that divisions obviated the need for bifurcation, which would
erode consistency.64 However, they "examined over a dozen proposals for
splitting the circuit and found no merit in any": 65 "[I]t is impossible to
create from the current Ninth Circuit two or more circuits [with an]
equitable number of appeals per judge and courts of appeals small enough
to operate with [adequate] collegiality [absent dividing California] between
judicial circuits-an [undesirable] option." 66
Because the Commission's rejection of bifurcation is partly premised
on the Commission's espousal of the divisional approach, and the
Commission did not specifically address the sponsors' arguments,
elaboration is warranted. The present court resists bifurcation, as the
commissioners and others have shown.67 Senate Bill 2184, like many prior
bills, would require the new Ninth Circuit's judges to resolve a much
larger, more complex caseload than members of the proposed Twelfth
59. Id. at x, 44. See also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 93 (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS]
(docket data); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 99-105 (1994); Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 824.
60. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-09 (1987). See also supra note 59; supra note 45 and accompanying text.
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix-x, 36.
62. See id. See also Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 827. One Ninth Circuit Judge,
Commission member, and avid proponent of its plan testified: "no one seriously questions how the
circuit performs its administrative functions. The circuit's size allows for flexibility in assignment
[and] economies of scale ..•." Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 80 (prepared statement of
Pamela Ann Rymer, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) (emphasis removed).
63. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 49-50. The Commission similarly stated that a split
would "deprive the West and the Pacific seaboard of a means for maintaining uniform federal law in
that area." Id. at x.
64. See id. at 52.
65. Id. at 53.
66. Id. at 52. But cf. Commission Critique, supra note 6, at 827 (urging a split).
67. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text See also Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing
Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 917, 945-46 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished
Idea of Circuit.Splitting, 44 EMORY LJ. 1357, 1409-15 (1995). But see Commission Critique, supra
note 6, at 827.
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Circuit.68 A split would also eliminate the circuit that has applied and tested,
over many years, cutting-edge concepts for addressing docket growth. 69
The Commission mentioned this attribute when it said the court's
administration was "on a par with that of other circuits, and innovative in
many respects"; reliance on Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs)
epitomizes this creativity.70 The court must continue rigorous experimentation; burgeoning appeals and scarce resources mean that most circuits
will resemble the court and the Ninth Circuit may well function as a
prototype.71
The senators' specific claims warrant a response here, although most
are treated above. The co-sponsors seemingly echoed the two Commission
notions72 and elided different actions: keeping abreast of circuit law and
tracking cases.73 However, the notion that judges need to review every
decision is a relic of the pre-computer era,74 and Ninth Circuit members
perform much opinion monitoring.75 Professor Hellman also persuasively
showed the dearth of empirical support for the second idea.76 His research,
which the Federal Judicial Center characterized as the only systematic
assessment of precedent's operation in a large court,77 found: "[T]he
pattern [of multiple relevant precedents] exemplified by high visibility
68. See, e.g., S. 431, lOSth Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Carl Tobias, Why
Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 590-91 (1997). These sources refute
Senator Hatch's claim that each new court's judges must read only half as many cases. See supra note
56 and accompanying text
69. See JOE s. CEcn., FED. JUDICIAL CI'R., ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985). See generally RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE:
THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE F'UTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D.
Hellman ed., 1990) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE] (detailing Ninth Circuit innovations in
structure and internal procedures).
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix, 68 (praising the successful Ninth Circuit use of
BAPs). See also Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat 4106, 410910 (suggesting that the court used BAPs so effectively that Congress required all circuits to evaluate them);
infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (analyzing special Ninth Circuit screening panels).
71. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 189, 239-40 (1997); Wallace, supra note 35.
72. They are that a large court's judges cannot read all cases, while big units have difficulty
developing and maintaining consistency and coherence. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
73. The Commission also did this. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Insofar as the
senators' concern is the volume of opinions, other courts issue more. See supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text
74. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
75. See supra note 34 and accompanying text
76. See supra notes 35-38, 72 and aceompanying text.
77. See JUDITH MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OfHER ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (1993). The Federal Judicial Center is the principal research
arm of the Federal Judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1994).
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issues . . . is not characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally.
Nor is intracircuit conflict."78 The senators also voiced concern about the
reversal rate,79 but that lacks relevance to administration and court
structure. The Commission appeared to recognize this. 80 Ninth Circuit
Judge, and Commission member, Pamela Rymer, speaking on behalf of the
Commission, testified: "[T]he problem [is not] the reversal rate. That is not
something that the White Commission thought was important.
I
81
Even if the rate had
completely agree that it should not be a factor."
greater applicability, the ten-year figures show that the quantity of Ninth
Circuit decisions reviewed annually was the highest among the circuits for
most years yet never eclipsed thirty decisions, which is less than 0.5% of its
merits terminations.82 The court's reversal rate was lower than the median
for three years, within 8% of the median for two years, and was greatest in
only one year.83
Senator Hatch also said that the en bane process is neither
representative nor employed enough.84 There are several responses to
these claims. The court finds that the device conserves limited institutional
resources and honors the needs of all judges to participate in lawdeclaration,85 while a statistical study showed eleven members "fairly
represent the court as a whole."86 Notwithstanding this determination,
the committee proposed, and the circuit endorsed, two changes which
would enlarge the number of appeals heard en banc.87 Those ideas are

78. Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 69, at 86. The study involved two discrete years of Ninth Circuit
opinions, which the court resolved over a much longer period. See MCKENNA, supra note 77, at 94.
79. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
80. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
81. Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 74 (statement of Pamela Ann Rymer, Circuit Judge,
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
82. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Law Library, Reversal Rate 1995-96 Term (revised
7125/96, organized by circuit) (unpublished table, on file with the Southern California Law Review);
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Law Library, Reversal Rate 1997-98 Term (revised 8/18/98, organized
by circuit) (unpublished table, on file with the Southern California Law Review).
83. See supra note 82. See also Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the
Country-Fact or Fiction?, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 1465 (1997); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and
Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 11 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998).
84. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. These claims are iuternally inconsistent.
85. See Hug, supra note 11, at 3. Every active and senior judge can request en bane
reconsideration, while the whole process fosters valuable interchange respecting legal issues. See id.
See also Hug, supra note 17, at 907.
86. Hug, supra note 11, at 3-4.
87. See COMMITI'EE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 4; Hug, supra note 11, at 4. For a
thorough critique of circuit-splitting, see BAKER, supra note 59, at 99-105.
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among many proffered by the committee, and they are in a third biII88 that I
discuss next.
C. CONTINUED NINTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF, AND EXPERIMENTATION
WITH, PROMISING MEASURES: SENATE BILL 1403
AND THE EVALUATION COMMITTEE

1. Senate Bill 1403
In July 1999, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) introduced Senate
Bill 1403,89 which would reduce the votes for en bane rehearing from a
majority of active judges to 40 percent, increase the panel size from eleven
to a majority and have a judge in the geographical unit from which an appeal
arises hear the case.90 The sponsor claimed that requiring fewer votes would
resolve "conflicts before they reach the Supreme Court,"91 and expanding the
panel would mean more judges could raise and treat "potential conflicts in
controversial cases."92 The senator also argued that regional assignments
would "address[] the appearance of ... any actual regional bias."93 She
concluded: insofar as the court is outside the jurisprudential mainstream,
the bill would "help corral stray decisions." 94

2. The Evaluation Committee
Since early 1999, an Evaluation Committee has been analyzing the
circuit vis-a-vis the Commission study and crafting constructive responses,
which include Senate Bill 1403's reforms and many others.95 Last July, the
committee circulated a notice to bar members seeking input on court
operations.96

88. See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill would also prescribe regional assignments. See
infra notes 90, 93, 106 and accompanying text.
89. See 145 CONG. REC. S8884 (daily ed. July 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). The July
20 date of introduction was between the dates on which the Senate and House held hearings. See supra
notes 44, 62.
90. See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999).
91. 145 CONG. REC. S8885.

92

Id.

93. Id.
94. Id. See also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
95. Chief Judge Hug named the committee. See CoMMIITEE INrnRlM REPoRT, supra note 12; Hug,
supra note 11.
96. See CoMMIITEE INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 12, at 1-2; Hug, supra note 11, at 2. The
committee sought ideas on the en bane process, unifonnity and certainty, regional concerns and
calendaring, delay and productivity, written and oral advocacy, mediation and technology. See id.
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Consistency was one committee priority. No empirical data show that
circuit precedent is disuniform;97 however, the committee believed that
court magnitude might foster a perception of inconsistency.98 It, thus,
emphasized the ability to detect early, and treat promptly, potential or
apparent inconsistencies by, for example, having the Office of Staff
Attorneys circulate reports that identify cases raising similar issues and that
summarize panel decisions two days before publication.99 The committee
requested that judges and lawyers inform the court of conflicts involving
unpublished memorandum dispositions and between those opinions and
published ones. 100 At the Evaluation Committee's suggestion, the Advisory
Rules Committee has proposed a two-year experiment, which would enable
counsel to cite unpublished memorandum dispositions in petitions for en
bane rehearing and in requests to publish dispositions. 101 Moreover, the
committee prescribed, and the circuit is testing, a regime in which staff
attorneys rely on substantive expertise and objective factors, such as
issuance of a dissent or a concurrence, to monitor petitions for rehearing en
bane and to help identify early possible conflicts for close evaluation by
judges. 102
The limited en bane process was a related focus of committee inquiry.
The court thinks that it saves limited resources and honors all judges'
interest in law-declaration, 103 but the committee sensed a perception that the
en bane process may be unrepresentative and, thus, sponsored an analysis which
confirmed its validity. 104 Notwithstanding this finding and the committee's
perception of a change in the circuit en bane culture favoring more grants,
the committee called on the court to consider increasing the size of the en

97. See supra notes 36-40, 76-78 and accompanying text.
98. See C0MM11TEE INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 12, at 8-9; Hug, supra note 11, at 2.
99. See COMMIITEE INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 12, at 9-10.
100. See id. See also Hug, supra note 11, at 4; Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Memorandum Re: Possible lntracircuit Conflict (Jan. 2000) (on file with author)
(requesting assistance from members of the academic community in identifying intracircuit conflicts
and providing the conflicts fonn).
101. They can also alert the court to conflicts. See Hug, supra note 1I, at 2.
102. See COMMIITEE INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 12, at 9-11; Hug, supra note 17, at 907.
Moreover, the committee is assessing the idea of internal review of all opinions for unifonnity before
issuance. See Hug, supra note 11, at 2. The committee concluded that the "court is properly
monitoring its opinions for consistency and resolving potential conflicts." COMMITrEE INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
103. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104. See Hug, supra note 11, at 3-4. The limited en bane court has issued more than 170
decisions since its 1980 authorization. One third were unanimous, and seventy-five percent had a
majority of eight to three or more, which strongly indicates that the full court would have decided
similarly. See id at 3.
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bane panel and decreasing the requisite votes, which would enlarge the
number of cases that receive en bane rehearing. 105 The court adopted the
reforms as more measured than Senate Bill 253 out of concern with
perceptions as much as realities. 106 Because the alterations will expand en
bane reconsideration, the court has prescribed experimentation with
quarterly sessions of the en bane court. 107
The Commission said the circuit has insufficient interpersonal
communication and collegiality, even while stating that technology's
continued use will enhance communication and case disposition. 108
However, no empirical data show that the court is uncollegial, and the
committee's experts suggest the opposite. 109 Nevertheless, the committee
developed proposals on regionalism and calendaring as responses to these
concerns and others regarding circuit links with the areas in its jurisdiction
and the importance of regional perspectives in appellate decisionmaking. l IO
The committee recommended, and the court is experimenting with,
regional assignments in the northern administrative unit; this practice
requires one judge stationed in the region to serve on three-judge panels
which hear appeals from that administrative unit. 111
The committee has proffered concepts to improve productivity and
disposition. At the committee's instigation, the court has experimented
with greater "batching" of appeals, which implicate similar issues or

105. See COMMITIEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 5; supra note 87 and accompanying text.
I 06. See Hug, supra note 11, at 4. See also Hellman, supra note I, at 378 (describing Senate Bill
253 as a "novel approach to federal appellate structure that is flawed both in conception and in
execution"). The court also endorsed regional assignments. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text; infra note 111 and accompanying text
107. See Hug, supra note 11, at4. See also Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 117 (prepared
statement of David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
108. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. See also Commission Critique, supra note 6,
at 823. The Commission frankly conceded that collegiality "cannot be quantified or measured."
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. For analyses of collegiality, see FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL
215 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1358-62 (1998); Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 585
(1995).
I 09. See COMMIITEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 14.
110. See id. at 12-13.
111. See id. at 8. See also Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 113 (prepared statement of
David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) (stating that critics argue that the
notion violates the tradition of "random selection of judges" and the idea that they apply federal law).
The court has increased sittings in more cities together with bench·bar activities to foster
communications across the circuit. SeeCOMMIITEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 13. In 1999, it
held "oral arguments and bench·bar meetings" in Anchorage, Coeur d' Alene (Idaho), Missoula
(Mont), San Diego, Phoenix, and Honolulu. Id.
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legislation before the identical argument panel for quicker resolution. 112
The committee urged the court to release the identity of motion panels on
the first day of every month and to resolve pending procedural motions
before oral arguments on the merits. 113 The committee has also suggested
that the circuit continue to employ the creative oral motions and screening
calendars. 114 A special panel resolves monthly almost 350 motions and
150 cases involving comparatively routine appeals that clear precedent
easily decides.11 5
The court can implement numerous committee proposals absent
legislative authorization, 116 but Congress would need to approve a few
Commission prescriptions, including two-judge, and district court
appellate, panels. 117 Prompt Senate confirmation of nominees to the
present openings in two of the twenty-eight active authorized judgeships
that have remained unfilled since 1996 would also enable the circuit to
function more efficaciously. 118
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Many reasons suggest why the third option is best. It is a cautious,
constructive effort to address valid concerns about the court. This approach
would achieve major Commission goals but not disrupt features of circuit
administration that have fostered expeditious, economical and fair
disposition. The method should specifically maintain and promote
consistency, primarily with additional monitoring; increase the en bane
process's legitimacy, principally through greater use; and cultivate
112. See COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 4-5; Final Report Hearing, supra note
44, at 115 (prepared statement of David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
113. See COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
114. See Hug, supra note 11, at 2. See also Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 115 (prepared
statement of David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
115. See Hug, supra note 11, at 3. See also Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 116 (prepared
statement of David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); COMMISSION REPoRT,
supra note 2, at 31. These and additional actions show the court is attempting to treat concerns other than
ones the Corrunission airs and to be responsive to all its consumers. The process is continuing, and the
court is corrunitted to introspection, testing, and innovation which will be even more effective. See Hug,
supra note 11, at 4. See also Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 118 (prepared statement of David
R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
116. Congress could authorize some ideas. See Final Report Hearing, supra note 44, at 117
(prepared statement of David R. Thompson, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
117. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 62-65. See also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 131-32 (1995) (analyzing these panels).
118. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the 9th Circuit, 19 REV. LrnG.
233 (2000). See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30; Commission Critique, supra note 6, at
822.
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regionalism, in part by assigning judges regionally. The course of action
would also leave the court intact and, thus, retain a large circuit's chief
benefits, such as uniform application of law across the West, flexible
judicial assignments, and economies of scale. Moreover, the concepts
would limit the great risks posed by divisions, namely their radical,
untested and irrevocable character, and bifurcation, which might be an
ineffective stop-gap and may well foster intercircuit inconsistency. If these
ideas prove insufficient, their incremental, conservative nature minimizes
the detriments, meaning that relatively little would have been lost, so that
Congress and the judiciary could then institute more drastic remedies, if
indicated.
The approach which legislators and the court should follow warrants
rather limited analysis here, because I assessed many particulars and
sketched the broad outline above. However, some treatment is required, as
this should inform understanding and future experimentation and reform.
Congress must reject the divisional plan and circuit-splitting, while
senators and representatives must encourage application and testing of
measures that seem productive. Lawmakers should enact Senate Bill 1403,
which permits changes in the en bane process and regional assignments. 119
Congress could also consider authorizing experimentation with a few
Commission suggestions, namely two-judge, and district court appellate,
panels, should it find them promising. 120 Moreover, the Senate must promptly
fill the present circuit vacancies. 121
The court should continue to explore, test and apply felicitous
approaches. The Evaluation Committee must assess aspects of operations
which have prompted concern and develop creative ideas for the circuit to
examine. It might consult Commission data showing that the court's
judges resolve cases most expeditiously once in their hands, even as the
circuit is slowest from notice of appeal to final disposition. 122 Scrutiny of
other conrts could also be instructive. For instance, Seventh Circuit
analysis may reveal how it offers oral argnments and published opinions at
percentages 12% and 30% higher, and relies on visiting judges at a rate

119. See supra notes 87-94, 106 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 117. But cf. Memorandum from Chief Judges Harry T. Edwards, Juan R.
Torruella, Ralph K. Winter, Edward R. Becker, J. Harvie Wilkinson, 111, Richard A. Posner, and Pasco
M. Bowman, II to Members of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (Nov. IO, 1998) (on file with author) (criticizing district court appellate panels).
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. See COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS, supra note 59, at 95 tbl.7.
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42% lower, than the Ninth Circuit. 123 The court should be receptive to
committee proposals and remain as responsive as possible to valid criticism
and to all consumers of circuit services. When experimentation indicates
that concepts are efficacious, the court should permanently implement them
in local rules or internal operating procedures or seek congressional
authorization, if necessary.
CONCLUSION
Professor Hellman greatly improves Ninth Circuit comprehension,
incisively criticizes the Commission work and concludes that Congress must
reject its plan and permit ongoing application of, and experimentation with,
effective measures. Because the Commission and the sponsors of Senate
Bill 2184 suggested radical change with minimal support, lawmakers
should eschew both the divisional and circuit-splitting approaches.
Congress, however, might want to adopt Senate Bill 1403, while the
Evaluation Committee must continue its valuable efforts.

123. See id. at 93 tbls.2 & 3, 108 tbl.6a. Compare supra note 102 with 3RD CIR. !OP 5.6 and 4TH
CIR. IOP 36.2 (suggesting that the circuit may have derived the idea for prepublication reports from
other courts' prepublication circulation of opinions).

